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Federal Civil Rights: Fact or Fiction? A
Proposal to Remove Eleventh
Amendment Immunity in Section
1983 Actions
Introduction
Professor Doe is a woman of color and a faculty member at a state
university. The university denied her past two applications for ten-
ure based on a partial hiring freeze for tenured positions. Two
faculty positions in Professor Doe's department, however, have
been flled with white male professors. Both of the professors were
granted tenure during the same time period as Professor Doe's
applications.
Professor Doe has applied for faculty positions at other com-
parable universities, but has not received any offers because she has
been denied tenure in her current position. Both university officials
and Professor Doe's colleagues insist that her performance is above
reproach, and only the lack of adequate funding prevents granting
her a tenured position.
Frustrated by the lack of any future advancement or job se-
curity, Professor Doe leaves her university position. The univer-
sity replaces her with a highly recruited white male professor to
whom they grant an immediate tenured position.
After learning of the university's action, Professor Doe files
suit against the state university in federal court seeking damages
for violation of her civil rights under federal civil rights statutes.
She cannot bring suit in state court because the "state and its agen-
cies" have not consented to federal civil rights suits brought in the
state court system. The defendant university files a motion to dis-
miss claiming eleventh amendment immunity as a "state agency."
The federal court grants the university's motion. Professor
Doe stands before the judicial system with federal civil rights but
no judicial forum in which she can seek relief.'
The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or eq-
uity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
1. The Professor Doe hypothetical is an illustrative example that is referred to through-
out this Note. The hypothetical serves to clarify the author's discussion of eleventh amend-
ment immunity and its logical consequences.
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zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."2
The Eleventh Amendment does not by its terms prohibit citizens from
bringing suits in federal courts against their states of residence. The
Amendment has evolved, however, to preserve the states' sovereign im-
munity from private suits brought in federal court,3 or when a private
plaintiff challenges the federal constitutionality of a state official's ac-
tion.' Recent Supreme Court decisions' give the states a near impenetra-
ble immunity from suits filed by private citizens such as the suit fied by
Professor Doe.6
Should federal courts be available to private plaintiffs, like Professor
Doe, who seek relief from state actions that violate federal civil rights
statutes? The current Supreme Court would answer with a definitive
"no" based on its eleventh amendment doctrine. When Congress en-
acted 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to protect against state violations of rights,"
it could not have foreseen the Supreme Court's use of eleventh amend-
ment doctrine to eviscerate Section 1983.8 Congress must revitalize Sec-
tion 1983 so it serves the purpose for which it was originally intended. In
light of recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment, Congress must mandate federal jurisdiction by depriving state de-
fendants of an eleventh amendment defense when Section 1983 suits are
brought by private plaintiffs in federal court. Legislative inaction will
leave private citizens with unenforceable rights to equitable relief and
damages for state violations of their federal civil rights.
The first section of this Note describes the history of the Eleventh
Amendment. Major eleventh amendment cases are presented to demon-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
4. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
5. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491
U.S. 223 (1989).
6. See supra text accompanying note 1.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979). The House Report expressly
states that the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 "created a right of action in Federal court" so that
"an aggrieved citizen is provided a neutral Federal forum in which to air his complaint, instead
of being forced to sue his state officials in State Courts." See also 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATU-
TORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL RIGHTS 591 (1970) (Congress passed § 1 of the
Ku Klux Klan Act to provide citizens a federal forum to hear their claims of alleged state
violations of federal civil rights).
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strate how the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment doctrine has ex-
panded state sovereign immunity to constitutional dimensions.
The second section of this Note discusses Congress's constitutional
authority to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity to Sec-
tion 1983 suits in federal courts. This section also identifies the rigorous
standard of clarity that Congress must meet to abrogate effectively the
eleventh amendment immunity currently enjoyed by the states.
The third section of this Note proposes an amendment to Section
1983, affirmatively granting federal jurisdiction over private plaintiffs'
Section 1983 claims against state defendants.
After summarizing the arguments supporting the adoption of the
proposed amendment to Section 1983, this Note concludes by arguing
that there is a legislative imperative to revitalize Section 1983 to protect
against state actions that violate civil rights guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9
I. History of the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment was ratified in response to Chisholm v.
Georgia,"0 in which the Supreme Court took original jurisdiction over a
common law contract suit filed by private citizens from South Carolina
against the State of Georgia. The Court literally translated its Article
IIIII grant of powers to exercise jurisdiction over the case based on party
diversity.12 Outraged by the Court's expansive reading of Article III,3
the states swiftly responded by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment within
five years of the unpopular Chisholm decision. 4 The Eleventh Amend-
ment thus was intended to limit the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts. 1 5
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
10. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Section 2 provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; ... -to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State ....
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 174-75 (1988).
13. Id. at 174.
14. Id.
15. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construc-
tion of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. RaV. 1033, 1033 (1983).
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A. Hans v. Louisiana: Changing the Party Diversity Focus
In the seminal case of Hans v. Louisiana,16 the Supreme Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits brought against a state by its
own citizens as well as suits brought by citizens of another state. In
Hans, a Louisiana citizen filed suit in federal court against the State of
Louisiana alleging that the state violated the Contract Clause of the Con-
stitution17 by defaulting on bonds purchased by the plaintiff citizen. The
Hans Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over suits between a state and its own citizens unless
the state expressly consented to suit in federal courts. 8 The Court recog-
nized Louisiana's eleventh amendment defense claim even though the
Amendment does not expressly prohibit federal jurisdiction over suits
brought by citizens against their own states. Moreover, the Hans Court's
inferred jurisdictional bar denied the plaintiff a federal forum to address
an alleged violation of the federal Constitution.19
Hans constitutionalizes2 ° state sovereign immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment. Under Hans, a state cannot be haled into federal
court unless it waives its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit in
federal court.2" The Court reasoned that to read the Eleventh Amend-
ment too literally22 would create an "anomalous result," in which a non-
consenting state may be "sued in the federal courts although not allowing
itself to be sued in its own courts."23 The Hans Court concluded that the
states never would have ratified the Eleventh Amendment if this inter-
pretation was intended because such a "supposition ... is almost an
absurdity on its face."'24
The Supreme Court's eleventh amendment interpretation under
Hans remained unchanged until the Court decided Ex parte Young2" in
1908.
16. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
18. Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.
19. Id. at 15.
20. In this Note, the term "constitutionalize" refers to the Court's determination that the
states gain sovereign immunity under the federal Constitution. Prior to Hans, states retained
sovereign immunity under common law principles. See Fletcher, supra note 15.
21. Hans, 134 U.S. ..t 13.
22. The Court described the literal application of the Eleventh Amendment as follows:
"[I]n cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in
the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the
citizens of other States, or of a foreign state. . . ." Id. at 10.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 15.
25. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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B. Ex parte Young: Creating a New Defendant
In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court allowed a federal court to
exercise its jurisdiction over a private suit in equity filed against a state
official, not the state itself. The plaintiffs in Young were stockholders in
railroad companies that were subject to a Minnesota rate control stat-
ute.26 The plaintiffs sought an injunction to enjoin the Minnesota state
attorney general, Young, from enforcing the Minnesota statute because it
allegedly violated the federal Constitution.27 The federal circuit court
issued a temporary injunction enjoining Attorney General Young from
enforcing the statute against the railroad companies.28 Young attempted
to enforce the statute in state court despite the federal injunction. The
federal circuit court responded by ordering Attorney General Young in
contempt.29 On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that state officials
whose actions violated the federal Constitution were stripped of any au-
thority associated with their state offices and thus were not legal repre-
sentatives of the state. The Young Court held that state officials who
acted unconstitutionally were therefore subject to suit in federal court.3"
Ex Parte Young Court pierced the states' armor of eleventh amendment
immunity by allowing private plaintiffs to file suits against state officials
in federal court. This pleading device creates a legal fiction by which
unconsenting states,31 through their officials, may be subject to federal
court jurisdiction.32
26. The Minnesota statutes set maximum rate schedules for both rail freight and passen-
gers. The state law also directed the railroad companies to adopt and publish the statutory
rates and imposed stiff fines and prison sentences upon any violators including an "officer,
agent or representative... [of] any railroad company." Id. at 127-29.
27. The plaintiffs alleged that the Minnesota statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause
and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 144.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Id. at 134.
30. The Young Court determined that the Eleventh Amendment was not relevant when a
state official's act was
alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without
the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or govern-
mental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempt-
ing by the use of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is
void because unconstitutional.
Id. at 159.
Professor Tribe analogizes this result to the corporate ultra vires doctrine, which permits
liability to attach to corporate officers who act beyond the scope of their employment. L.
TRIBE, supra note 12, § 3-27, at 193.
31. This Note defines an "unconsenting state" as a state which retains its common law
sovereign immunity because it has not consented to federal court jurisdiction.
32. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1116-17
(3d 1988).
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Pursuant to Ex parte Young, Section 1983 plaintiffs may seek equita-
ble relief from unconstitutional state actions by naming a state official
and not the state as the party defendant.33 When Section 1983 plaintiffs
seek damages, however, is the defendant state official solely liable as an
individual? If this is the case, then Section 1983 plaintiffs would be un-
able to recover substantial damage awards unless the named defendant
owned equally substantial assets subject to adverse judgments-an un-
likely circumstance. The relevant inquiry is whether a state may there-
fore be liable to Section 1983 plaintiffs through indemnification of its
employees despite the Eleventh Amendment.
C. Relief Allowed Under the Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court addressed the relief issue in Edelman v. Jor-
dan,34 in which welfare recipients filed a Section 1983 class action against
state officials in the Illinois Department of Public Aid for injunctive and
declaratory relief.35 The plaintiff class alleged that the state officials
wrongfully withheld welfare benefits in violation of both federal law36
and the Fourteenth Amendment37 by exceeding the statutory time limits
allowed to process applications for benefits. The class sought injunctive
relief to compel the state officials to pay all benefits owed to wrongfully
denied beneficiaries.38 The federal district court granted the plaintiff
class's request for injunctive relief and ordered the defendants to remit
the "benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants.., who applied...
and were determined eligible .... 3
In reversing the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court held
that the Ex parte Young fiction 4° only applied to state officials when the
plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief-that is, relief that calls for
conforming future conduct.41 The Edelman plaintiffs sought retroactive
relief, however, in the form of "equitable restitution" of their wrongfully
33. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see also infra notes 34-45 and accompa-
nying text.
34. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
35. Id. at 653.
36. The plaintiff class alleged that the defendants failed to disburse benefits and determine
eligibility within the applicable time frame. The plaintiff class argued that the defendants'
delays violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-85 (1964). Id. at 655-56.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The complaint alleged the defendants had violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by their four month refusal to process
and allow the named plaintiff's claim "while processing and allowing the claims of those simi-
larly situated .... ." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 653 n.1.
38. Id at 656.
39. Id.
40. See supra notes 31-32.
41. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
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denied benefits.42 The Court reasoned that the retroactive relief sought
requires payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question deter-
mination, but as a form of compensation to those whose applica-
tions were processed on the slower time schedule at a time when
petitioner [the defendant state officials] was under no court-im-
posed obligation to conform to a different standard.43
The Edelman Court determined that the relief against the state officials
could be satisfied only by placing large burdens on the state's treasury,
making the relief sought "indistinguishable" from an award of damages
against the state and not the defendant state officials.' The Court ac-
cordingly found that the State of Illinois was the real party in interest,
and allowed Illinois to invoke its eleventh amendment immunity even
though the state was not a named defendant in the class action.45
Edelman diminished the remedial power of Exparte Young for Sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs seeking a federal forum to adjudicate their claims
against defendant state officials. The new rule emerging after Edelman,
expressly limiting Young's fiction, prevents private parties from seeking
damage awards against state officials in federal court. Federal courts are
therefore limited to granting only prospective injunctive relief.
Only four years later, however, in Hutto v. Finney,46 the Supreme
Court allowed retroactive relief when it found that Congress abrogated
eleventh amendment immunity by providing for attorneys' fees awards.
The Hutto Court directed the state to pay the prevailing plaintiff's attor-
ney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. 47 While acknowledging the
award was a form of retroactive relief, the Court held that Congress ab-
rogated any state claim of immunity when it passed the Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act pursuant to its "plenary power.., to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 48 Most importantly, Hutto explicitly rec-
ognized Congress's authority to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
immunity to suits in federal courts, which allowed remedies regardless of
their prospective or retroactive nature.
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,4 9 the Court re-
sumed its attack on Ex Parte Young. Pennhurst held that the fiction cre-
42. Id. at 668.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 677-78.
46. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) codifies the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, which
awards attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in federal civil rights cases.
48. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693-94.
49. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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ated by Ex parte Young was not applicable when a plaintiff claimed a
state official's act violated state rather than federal constitutional law.50
The plaintiff class in Pennhurst was comprised of residents of a state
facility for the mentally retarded. The class members filed suit in federal
court alleging violations of their rights under both the federal Constitu-
tion and federal law in addition to state law violations."' The state facil-
ity, facility officials, the State Department of Public Welfare, and other
state and county officials were named as defendants. The class sought
prospective injunctive relief mandating that state officials provide appro-
priate living arrangements for the class members.52
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment granting
plaintiffs prospective injunctive relief under Pennsylvania law.53  The
Court held that the federal court lacked pendent jurisdiction over the
state law claims against state officials because the Eleventh Amendment
barred relief against an unconsenting state.54 While the Pennhurst Court
preserved federal jurisdiction for claims challenging the federal constitu-
tionality of a state official's conduct, it refused to apply Ex Parte Young
to suits against state officials based on state law violations.55
The Court's rationale for limiting the Ex parte Young fiction to fed-
eral constitutional claims was to recognize the need to "promote the vin-
dication of federal rights."56 The Court concluded that the need to
"vindicate the supreme authority of federal law"57 was not present when
the plaintiff alleged violations of state, not federal, law.58
Pennhurst added to the confounding patchwork of eleventh amend-
ment cases that results in a list of compulsory "do's" for Section 1983
plaintiffs seeking to avert the eleventh amendment hurdle. To secure a
50. Id. at 106.
51. The plaintiffs claimed that the deplorable conditions at the state facility violated their
rights under: (1) the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, (2) 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1988), which codifies § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (3) 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6011, 6063 (1988), which codify the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, and (4) the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,
codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1990-1991). The
class sought both damages and injunctive relief. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 92. On an earlier
appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court after determining that the
plaintiff class had no substantive rights under 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1988). The district court was
directed to determine whether the class was entitled to relief under its other causes of action.
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 95.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 97.
54. Id. at 106.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 105.
57. Id. at 106.
58. Id.
Spring 1991] ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY AND § 1983 ACTIONS 703
federal forum to redress their claims against their own states, Section
1983 plaintiffs must satisfy three requisite elements: (1) Name a state
official, and not the state, as defendant; (2) file for prospective injunctive
relief; and (3) allege that the named defendant violated the plaintiff's
federally guaranteed civil rights under either a federal statute or the fed-
eral Constitution. 9 Pennhurst effectively denies Section 1983 plaintiffs of
any judicial forum to redress concomitant state law claims by explicitly
denying federal court pendent jurisdiction over state law claims. The
state court may also lack jurisdiction to adjudicate suits against the state
or its officials if state immunity statutes preclude such private actions.
Taking the reasoning further, if federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate Section 1983 claims against state officials, must state courts take
jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims? The role of state courts in Section
1983 litigation was addressed recently in Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police. °
D. The Eleventh Amendment and State Court Jurisdiction
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, the Court held that
neither "a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'per-
sons'" subject to Section 1983 suits brought in state courts.61 In Will,
the plaintiff brought a Section 198362 action in state court naming the
Director of State Police and the Department of the Michigan State Police
as defendants.63 Will, an employee of the defendant Department, alleged
that the defendants denied his promotion "because his brother had been
a student activist and the subject of a 'red squad' file maintained by" the
defendants." Will filed his Section 1983 action in state court claiming
violations of both federal and state constitutions. 65 The Michigan
Supreme Court held that the named defendants were not subject to Sec-
tion 1983 provisions because neither the state nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are "persons" for Section 1983 purposes.66
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan Supreme
Court's decision, thereby resolving the conflict among the state and fed-
eral courts whether state governments were proper party defendant for
59. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 3-27, at 194.
60. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
61. Id. at 71.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For the full text of Section 1983, see supra note 7.
63. Will, 491 U.S. at 60.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 61.
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Section 1983 purposes.6 7 The Will Court reasoned that a suit against
state officials acting in their official capacities was a suit against the state
itself.6 The Court accordingly held that because states are not "per-
sons" under Section 1983, states are not subject to suit in state court
under this federal civil rights statute. Although the Court acknowledged
that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to state courts, the Court
concluded that the Amendment barred the plaintiff's cause of action be-
cause his suit was against the State of Michigan, and Michigan had not
waived its immunity to Section 1983 suits.69
Will reveals the Supreme Court's alarming willingness to apply the
Eleventh Amendment to limit state court jurisdiction to adjudicate Sec-
tion 1983 cases. In the wake of Will, the Eleventh Amendment now se-
verely limits Section 1983 plaintiffs' access to any judicial forum-state
or federal-that can redress unconstitutional state actions. Will constitu-
tionalizes state sovereign immunity so that state governments, agencies
and officials are constitutionally protected from private suits in either
state or federal courts at the expense of rendering federal civil rights vir-
tually unenforceable.
E. The State's Constructive Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
A line of cases, developed independently from Ex parte Young and
its progeny, presented an alternative means by which private plaintiffs
could avoid the eleventh amendment bar to federal jurisdiction. In
Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department,70
the Court held that Alabama could waive its eleventh amendment immu-
nity by consenting to suit in federal court.
The Parden plaintiffs were Alabama citizens and employees of the
state-run railroad. They sued the state railroad company in federal dis-
trict court under the Federal Employee's Liability Act (FELA)7' seeking
damages for personal injuries incurred while working for the defendant.
Alabama, as the owner-operator of the defendant company, argued that
its railroad company "was an agency of the State and the State had not
waived its sovereign immunity from suit."72 The federal district court
accepted Alabama's eleventh amendment immunity defense claim and
granted the state's motion to dismiss.73 The Supreme Court granted cer-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 71.
69. Id. at 67.
70. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
71. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 56, 60 (1988).
72. Parden, 377 U.S. at 185.
73. Id.
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tiorari and reversed the judgment of dismissal.74
The Supreme Court ruled that Alabama had waived its constitu-
tional immunity to suit in federal court by participating as a common
carrier in interstate commerce. 7' The Parden Court reasoned that in
passing FELA, Congress had the authority to require states to consent to
suit in federal court as a condition precedent to participating in the
FELA program. Congress had imposed the condition of amenability to
suit in federal courts upon common carriers participating in interstate
commerce. Alabama, as defendant, voluntarily participated as a com-
mon carrier in interstate commerce with prior notice of the condition
imposed by Congress.76 Alabama thus constructively waived its eleventh
amendment immunity. The Court flatly rejected Alabama's argument
that its state constitution expressly proscribed any waiver of its sovereign
immunity, constructive or actual. 7 7 The Court determined that to find
eleventh amendment immunity in FELA
would result, moreover, in a right without a remedy; it would
mean that Congress made "every" interstate railroad liable in dam-
ages to injured employees but left one class of such employees-
those whose employers happen to be state owned-without any ef-
fective means of enforcing that liability. We are unwilling to con-
clude that Congress intended so pointless and frustrating a result. 78
Parden's constructive waiver doctrine created a door to federal
court for Section 1983 plaintiffs, but the Court quickly slammed the door
shut by assaulting the doctrine in Employees v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare of Missouri.79 The Employees Court affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint by recognizing the State
of Missouri's eleventh amendment immunity defense.8 0 The Court held
that the Eleventh Amendment barred private suits against a nonprofit
state agency in federal court under FLSA.81 The Court distinguished
Parden by determining that the Missouri health agencies were not oper-
ated for profit, which distinguished them from the Alabama railroad
company in Parden.82 The Court reasoned that when a state's nonprofit
74. Id. at 185, 198.
75. Id. at 189-90.
76. Id. at 187.
77. Id. at 194.
78. Id. at 190.
79. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). The plaintiffs were Missouri citizens and employees of various
Missouri health agencies. The plaintiffs filed their suit in federal district court seeking: (1)
overtime pay due under the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988),
(2) damages, and (3) attorneys' fees. Employees, 411 U.S. at 281.
80. Id. at 280-8 1.
81. Id. at 285-86.
82. Id. at 284.
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enterprise is concerned,
[i]t is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the
Commerce Clause... desired silently to deprive the States of an
immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Consti-
tution. Thus, we cannot conclude that Congress conditioned the
operation of these facilities on the forfeiture of immunity from suit
in a federal forum [when it enacted FLSA].83
The Court concluded that Congress had indicated no purpose to remove
the states' constitutional immunity by enacting FLSA, thereby placing
the states "on the same footing as other [private] employers." '84
Although the Court acknowledged that Congress had the authority to
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity under the Commerce
Clause,85 the Court held that Congress failed to make its intent to abro-
gate state immunity sufficiently clear in either FLSA's statutory language
or legislative history.86 Employees weakened the constructive waiver
doctrine by requiring Congress to do more than legislate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause if it intended to hold states subject to federal court
jurisdiction. In its attempt to limit the constructive waiver doctrine, the
Court did not overrule Parden, but applied an increasingly rigorous stan-
dard of clarity that Congress had to satisfy in order to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity. The Court, however, provided little guidance as
to what statutory language would meet its standard of clarity.
Edelman v. Jordan 87 continued the Court's erosion of the construc-
tive waiver doctrine. In Edelman, the State of Illinois failed to disburse
welfare benefits in compliance with federal regulations governing rele-
vant provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA).8 The plaintiff class
was comprised of Illinois citizens whose welfare benefits were withheld
by the state in violation of federal regulations. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Illinois constructively waived its eleventh
amendment immunity when it chose to participate in the federal welfare
assistance program pursuant to the SSA.8 9
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and held that a state's mere
participation in a federally funded program was insufficient to compel a
83. Id at 285.
84. Id.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
86. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
87. 415 U.S. 651 (1974); see supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382-85 (1988). Under selected provisions of the SSA, aged, blind or
disabled individuals who meet specified requirements are eligible for federal benefits, which are
administered through state agencies. Since Edelman was decided, §§ 1384-85 have been
omitted.
89. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672-73.
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finding that the state consented to suits in federal court.9° The Court
also held that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associ-
ated with the [states'] surrender of constitutional rights... ."91 A state
therefore waives its eleventh amendment immunity "only where [the rel-
evant federal statute] stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.' ,92 The Edelman Court determined that
the only federal sanction provided by the SSA was "termination of future
allocations of federal funds when a participating State failed to conform
with federal law." 93 The Court held that without more, the statute's pro-
vision did not constitute a state's constructive waiver of its eleventh
amendment immunity.94
In dicta, the Court further suggested that the Edelman plaintiffs
could have brought a Section 1983 action in federal court. The Eleventh
Amendment, however, limited their remedy to prospective injunctive re-
lief that excluded the recovery of any benefits wrongfully denied prior to
the filing of the lawsuit against the state.95 If federal courts may grant
only prospective relief, state welfare agencies may wrongfully withhold
welfare benefits until a suit is brought to compel state agencies to con-
form their future behavior to the statutory requirements. The ability of
low income and indigent people to file lawsuits is greatly limited, if not
impossible, particularly when their daily subsistence depends upon their
welfare benefits.
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon96 went further than Edelman
by holding that even a state's "general waiver" of immunity-expressed
in the state's constitution-is ineffective against the Eleventh Amend-
ment.97 The plaintiff, Douglas Scanlon, fied suit against a California
state hospital and the California Department of Mental Health for alleg-
edly denying him employment because of his physical disabilities.9
Scanlon sought compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief in fed-
eral district court, claiming that the defendants violated the federal Re-
90. Id. at 673-74.
91. Id. at 673.
92. Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
93. Id. at 674.
94. Id.
95. Ii at 677.
96. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
97. TheAtascadero Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that California had "waived its
immunity by virtue of Article III, § 5 of the California Constitution," id. at 240, which pro-
vides that "'[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as
shall be directed by law.'" Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5).
98. The plaintiff suffered from unilateral blindness and diabetes. Id at 236.
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habilitation Act of 197399 and state fair employment statutes.1°°
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that California had implic-
itly consented to suit in federal court by participating in the Rehabilita-
tion Act programs.101 In reversing, the Supreme Court explicitly
endorsed a rule of statutory interpretation now referred to as the "Atas-
cadero standard." 0 2 The Atascadero standard defines the degree of spec-
ificity that Congress must use when drafting a federal statute to abrogate
the states' eleventh amendment immunity. To meet the required stan-
dard, Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment "[o]nly by mak-
ing its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 103
The Rehabilitation Act provided that "[t]he remedies, procedures,
and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or
failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of
such assistance . . ." 4 The Atascadero Court held that this "general
authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal stat-
utory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."10 The
Atascadero standard eviscerated the constructive waiver doctrine without
explicitly overruling Parden.
The Court completed its dismantling of the constructive waiver doc-
trine by expressly overruling Parden in Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation.106 The plaintiff, Jean Welch, flied a
suit against the State of Texas and the State Highway Department under
the Jones Act,107 which incorporated the remedial provision in FELA.
The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff's suit
against Texas-and its state agency-because it did not consent to such
suits by merely employing people eligible for relief under the Jones
Act. 10 The Court applied the Atascadero standard to the Jones Act and
concluded that the statutory language lacked the requisite clarity to re-
99. 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-99 (1988).
100. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
101. Id. at 237.
102. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); see also infra notes 152-165 and accompa-
nying text.
103. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
104. Id at 245 (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 246.
106. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
107. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act expressly provided for federal jurisdiction and
expressly incorporated the remedies authorized by FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 56, 60 (1988).
Welch, 483 U.S. at 471 n.1.
108. Id. at 476.
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move the state's eleventh amendment immunity.109
Welch illustrates the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Elev-
enth Amendment. The Court interprets the Eleventh Amendment such
that it swallows up the Article 11110 grant of federal jurisdiction to hear
cases based on questions of federal law."' The Article III grant of juris-
diction over questions of federal law gives federal courts the power to
adjudicate claimed violations of Section 1983-a federal law designed to
protect individuals from unconstitutional state actions. The Supreme
Court's reading of the Eleventh Amendment not only destroys the fed-
eral courts' power to hear Section 1983 cases, but precludes the federal
courts from granting individuals any effective relief from state actions
that violate federal civil rights laws.
The cases discussed illustrate the Supreme Court's inconsistent defi-
nitions of eleventh amendment immunity parameters. By refusing to
overrule Hans v. Louisiana,"2 the Court has created an assortment of
legal devices and arbitrary line-drawing in its eleventh amendment juris-
prudence. As a result, the federal courts are denied jurisdiction in cases
based on questions of both federal constitutional and statutory law. Sec-
tion 1983 plaintiffs' 13 are entitled to relief from violations of their civil
rights, but states may use the Eleventh Amendment to deny plaintiffs a
judicial forum to vindicate their right to redress.
H. Proposal to Achieve Congressional Abrogation of the
States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity
This Note proposes that Congress amend Section 1983 to grant fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over private suits against states and their officials
for violations of federal civil rights, 4 and to grant all the relief available
under Section 1983 regardless of the relief's nature--prospective or
retroactive. 115
Congress finds its authority to abrogate states' eleventh amendment
immunity pursuant to either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Com-
merce Clause.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
11. See Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't., 411 U.S. 279, 313-15 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Fletcher, supra note 15.
112. 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
113. For example, Professor Doe's case illustrates the severe limitations that the Eleventh
Amendment imposes upon Section 1983 plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying note 1.
114. Whether Congress will enact an amendment to Section 1983 to meet these objectives
is subject to political speculation and beyond the scope of this Note.
115. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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A. The Fourteenth Amendment as a Source of Authority
Commentators assert that Congress may abrogate eleventh amend-
ment immunity when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers or "to the
enforcement clauses of various constitutional amendments .... 1 1 6 The
Supreme Court also has acknowledged that Congress may abrogate elev-
enth amendment immunity "pursuant to a valid exercise of power." '117
Although the authorization to abrogate is vague, the Court has shed
some light on what "exercise of power" passes constitutional muster.
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"8 the Court held that Congress has the au-
thority to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
concluded that Congress had clearly stated its intent to hold the states
subject to the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964120
when amendments to Title VII were enacted in 1972.121 The Court held
that Congress had the requisite authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to grant federal jurisdiction notwithstanding the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The Court explained that
[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 [of the Fourteenth
Amendment], not only is it exercising legislative authority that is
plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising
that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on
116. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 3-26, at 185-86. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION § 7.7, at 365-66 (1989) (discusses how and under what powers Congress
may override the Eleventh Amendment).
While the Court acknowledges that Congress has the power to abrogate validly the states
eleventh amendment immunity, the Court offers no rationale that reconciles Congress's ac-
knowledged power to abrogate with the majority's view that state sovereign immunity is con-
stitutionalized under the Eleventh Amendment. If state sovereign immunity is based on
federal constitutional provisions, then its abrogation can only be achieved by constitutional
amendment; not by an act of Congress.
117. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). In Green, welfare recipients, who were
also citizens of Michigan, filed a § 1983 class action in federal court against the director of the
Michigan Department of Social Services. The class sought declaratory and notice relief. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment granting the defendant's motion to dismiss because the
Eleventh Amendment barred relief to Michigan citizens filing suit against their own state in
federal court. The Court stated that "States may not be sued in federal court unless they
consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power,
unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity." Id. (emphasis added).
118. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
119. Id. at 456. Section 5 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1988).
121. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453 n.9. The 1972 amendments expressly included employees
of "a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision." Id. at 449 n.2.
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state authority.
122
Fitzpatrick underscores the Fourteenth Amendment's role in limit-
ing state government conduct to protect individual citizens from unlaw-
ful state actions. 123 The Fitzpatrick Court subordinated the Eleventh
Amendment to the Fourteenth Amendment by recognizing that the
"Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies.., are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 124
The Supreme Court's holding that Congress may abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment 25 was
affirmed one year later in Hutto v. Finney.'26 The Hutto Court awarded
the plaintiffs attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 stating that
"Congress has plenary power to set aside the States' immunity from ret-
roactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." 127 The
Court again emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment is subject to the
limitations imposed by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 128
The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim in Papasan v. Allain.'2 9
The Papasan plaintiffs were local school officials and schoolchildren in
Mississippi who filed suit in federal court against various state officials
for allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause130 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.31 The plaintiffs alleged that in the 1850s, Mississippi mis-
managed lands held in trust for the plaintiff schoolchildren.132 The
plaintiffs asserted that this past state conduct resulted in the current une-
qual state financial support to their school district as compared with
other public schools in Mississippi. 133 The disparity in the state's fund-
ing was the basis of the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.
122. Id. at 456.
123. I at 455.
124. Id. at 456.
125. It remains an open question whether private plaintiffs may sue their own state in
federal court for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment alone-without resorting to any
federal statutory violations. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 290 n.23 (1977). See gener-
ally E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 116, § 7.7, at 366 (discussing how federal courts have
treated suits directly under the Fourteenth Amendment).
126. 437 U.S. 678 (1978); see supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
127. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693.
128. IM at 698-99 n.31.
129. 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 274.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the "Eleventh Amendment would
not bar relief necessary to correct... [Mississippi's] current violation of
the Equal Protection Clause" because the state's unequal distribution of
funds was "precisely the type of continuing violation for which a remedy
may permissibly be fashioned ....
While the Supreme Court recognizes that Congress has the power to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity, the Court has been reluctant to
find that Congress has exercised its power pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Quern v. Jordan,131 Atascadero State Hospi-
tal v. Scanlon,136 Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,137 and
Dellmuth v. Muth, 131 the Court determined that Congress failed to make
its intent sufficiently clear in various federal statutes to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment.
Quern v. Jordan held that Congress had not intended to override the
states' eleventh amendment immunity when it enacted Section 1983.139
The Quern plaintiffs were Illinois welfare recipients who had filed an ear-
lier Section 1983 class action in federal court against officials of the Illi-
nois Department of Public Aid.1" The class sued the defendants for
failing to process properly applications for welfare benefits. The defend-
ant state officials appealed from the federal court order that directed the
state public aid office to send advisory notices to all class members in-
forming them of procedures by which they could apply for wrongfully
denied welfare benefits.141 The state officials asserted that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the ordered relief, while the plaintiff class argued
that Section 1983 abrogated Illinois' eleventh amendment immunity.142
The Quern Court determined that although Congress acted pursu-
ant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 187 1,143 the statutory language failed to sufficiently express
the requisite legislative intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 
44
The Court held that
134. IL at 282.
135. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
136. 473 U.S. 234 (1985); see supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
137. 491 U.S. 58 (1989); see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
138. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
139. Quern, 440 U.S. at 341.
140. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
141. Quern, 440 U.S. at 334.
142. Id. at 335-38.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 finds its origin in this Act. See supra note 7 for the full text of the
statute.
144. Quern, 440 U.S. at 343.
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Section 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on
its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor
does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of
state liability and which shows that Congress considered and
firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
the States.
145
Quern foreshadowed the Court's subsequent decision in Atascadero,
which articulated the standard that "Congress must express its intention
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself."146 The Atascadero Court held that the Rehabilitation
Act 47 failed to "evince an unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to
the jurisdiction of the federal courts."'1 48
In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police 1 49 the Court applied
the strict Atascadero standard to Section 1983. The Will Court deter-
mined that although Section 1983
provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil lib-
erties,... it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek
a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.
The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has
waived its immunity, or unless Congress has exercised its un-
doubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to over-
ride that immunity.150
The Will Court concluded that although Congress could have abrogated
the Eleventh Amendment when it enacted Section 1983, it had failed to
use the statutory language required by the Atascadero standard.5 Will
incredibly extends the eleventh amendment jurisdictional bar to state
court adjudication of Section 1983 actions even though the Amendment
only applies to federal courts.
In Dellmuth v. Muth,1 52 decided in the same term as Will, the Court
applied the Atascadero standard to another federal statute enacted pursu-
ant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Dellmuth Court
again held that Congress could have abrogated the states' eleventh
amendment immunity when it enacted the Education of the Handi-
145. Id. at 345.
146. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985); see supra notes 96-105
and accompanying text.
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-99 (1989).
148. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
149. 491 U.S. 58 (1989); see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 66 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151. See id. at 65.
152. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
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capped Act (EHA)153 pursuant to its power in Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 54 The Court, however, tempered this grant of
authority by emphasizing that Congress could achieve eleventh amend-
ment abrogation only by satisfying the Atascadero standard in the statu-
tory language itself.' 55
Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, 5 6 held that the EHA
failed to meet the Atascadero standard because it contained no specific
reference to abrogate "either the Eleventh Amendment or the States' sov-
ereign immunity."'157 Justice Kennedy gave the EHA's abundant refer-
ences to the "states" and "its delineation of the States' important role in
securing an appropriate education for handicapped children," no more
weight than a "permissible inference" to make states "logical defend-
ants."' 58 The inference, however, would not support a determination
that Congress intended to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.15 9
The majority went so far as to hold that "[l]egislative history generally
will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."'"
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, dissented declaring that a "genuine concern to identify Congress'
purpose would lead the Court to consider both the logical inferences to
be drawn from the text and structure of the ERA,... and the statute's
legislative history.., in deciding whether Congress intended to subject
States to suit in federal court."'' The dissent concluded that the major-
ity's specialized drafting rules were unjustified and completely ignored
Congress's intent.' 62
The Supreme Court clearly has acknowledged that Congress has the
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by exercising its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has added an exacting
burden, however, by imposing the Atascadero standard on the language
of any statute that Congress legislates. Dellnuth forces Congress to meet
an even greater degree of clarity in its legislative drafting because (1) the
153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)(9), 1415(e)(2), 1415(e)(4)(G) (1988).
154. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227-28.
155. Id.
156. Justice Kennedy, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was joined by Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opin-
ion. Id. at 224.
157. Id. at 231.
158. Id. at 232.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 230.
161. Id. at 239 (emphasis in original) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 238-40.
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Court may consider legislative history generally irrelevant when inter-
preting a federal statute in light of the Eleventh Amendment, 163 (2) stat-
utes replete with references to the states fail to satisfy the Atascadero
standard,1 and (3) explicit references to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity or the Eleventh Amendment may be required. 65 Short of creating
boiler plate language, Congress is not likely to consider the Dellmuth
requirements when it legislates in the future.
B. The Commerce Clause as a Source of Authority to Abrogate
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Congress may abrogate eleventh amendment immunity pursuant to
its commerce clause power to regulate interstate commerce. 166 In
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department,167 the
Court held that states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when
they granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.1 6
The states retained no immunity privilege with respect to interstate com-
merce when they ratified the federal Constitution. Given their abdica-
tion to Congress in the area of commerce, the states have no immunity to
assert when sued by private citizens claiming state violations of federal
statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare of Missouri 169
limited Congress's authority to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity
under the Commerce Clause. The Employees Court implied that Con-
gress could abrogate eleventh amendment immunity pursuant to the
Commerce Clause by "indicating in some way by clear language that the
[states's] constitutional immunity was swept away." 170 Similar to the
fourteenth amendment cases, 17 1 the Employees Court began to require
greater clarity of legislative intent to abrogate eleventh amendment im-
munity when Congress exercised its commerce clause powers.
More recently, in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public
Transportation,172 the Court intimated that the Commerce Clause may
be a separate source of authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. But see Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 233 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
166. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
167. 377 U.S. 184 (1964); see supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
168. Parden, 377 U.S. at 191.
169. 411 U.S. 279 (1973); see supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
170. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-87.
171. See supra notes 117-162 and accompanying text.
172. 483 U.S. 468 (1987); see supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
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ment. 173 The Welch Court expressly assumed "that the authority of
Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is not
confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."174
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company, the Supreme Court defini-
tively determined that "Congress has the authority to... [render states
liable in money damages in federal court] ... when legislating pursuant
to the Commerce Clause." '175 The critical issue before the Union Gas
Court was whether Congress had the constitutional authority-pursuant
to the Commerce Clause-to abrogate the states' eleventh amendmentimmunity when it enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 176 Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the Court, reasoned that
[b]ecause the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States
at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the con-
gressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the
authority to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the
extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress
found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them lia-
ble .... [The states] gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the
Constitution containing the Commerce Clause, rather than on a
case-by-case basis. 177
After Union Gas, Congress may abrogate pursuant to its commerce
clause powers and, more remarkably, the Court will not apply the rigor-
ous Atascadero standard to legislation enacted pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.
Congress may abrogate the Eleventh Amendment if the statutory
language clearly expresses Congress's intent to do so. In the past, the
Court has found the requisite intent in statutes enacted pursuant to either
the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause. The Court, how-
ever, will apply the exacting Atascadero standard of intent to statutes
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 The Court will not
apply the Atascadero standard to statutes enacted pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause. 1
79
173. Id. at 475 n.5.
174. Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.
175. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9604, 9606, 9607(a) (1988).
177. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19-20.
178. See Deilmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); see also supra notes 152-165 and accom-
panying text.
179. See supra notes 167-177 and accompanying text.
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An explanation for the Court's disparate review of legislative intent
may be its deep concern that federal civil rights litigation, particularly
Section 1983 suits, would substantially overburden the courts and place
an excessive burden of liability for civil rights violations upon state
defendants.13 0
The Court has also expressed great reluctance to limit states' elev-
enth amendment immunity by refusing to overrule Hans v. Louisiana 8 1
in Fourteenth Amendment enforcement cases. 182 The Court's reluctance
illustrates its move toward increased deference to federalism and
majoritarian interests when individual rights are jeopardized by state
government actions. The Court's reticence renders Section 1983 ineffec-
tive in protecting individuals from unlawful state actions. Congress,
therefore, must amend this important civil rights statute to abrogate elev-
enth amendment immunity.
C. Statutory Language Necessary to Abrogate Eleventh Amendment
Immunity
The Supreme Court has endorsed fully the Atascadero standard'83 of
unmistakably, unequivocal, clear legislative intent to abrogate success-
fully the states' eleventh amendment immunity. In so doing, the
Supreme Court eviscerates many federal statutes, particularly those pro-
tecting federal civil rights, by applying the Atascadero standard retroac-
tively to laws enacted prior to the Court's unmistakable, unequivocal
adoption of this rigorous standard.'84 This rigid, judicially created rule
for legislative drafting demands that Congress take affirmative steps to
ensure that states may not violate federal civil rights with impunity.
The Dellmuth decision provides the clearest and most recent gui-
dance as to what statutory language the Court will regard as meeting the
Atascadero standard. Dellmuth specifies that a statute must (1) make
direct reference to the Eleventh Amendment, or (2) make direct refer-
ence to the states' sovereign immunity, in order to abrogate the Eleventh
180. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 20 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, joined in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion.
181. 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
182. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987);
Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 229 n.2.
183. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
184. In Justice Brennan's strong dissent in Dellmuth, joined by Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, he stated that the "[r]etroactive application of [the Atascadero standard] is
simply unprincipled." Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent at-
tacked the majority's imposition of "an interpretative standard that Congress could have antic-
ipated only with the aid of a particularly effective crystal ball." Id. at 241.
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Amendment."'5 Dellmuth further specifies that legislative history "gen-
erally will be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress in-
tended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment .... [And] if Congress'
intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be
futile, because by definition the rule of Atascadero will not be met."1 16
Dellmuth clearly states that any legislative history that Congress gener-
ates is insufficient to bring states within federal jurisdiction for violations
of federal statutes. 18 7
Based on the Dellmuth guidelines, Congress must explicitly refer to
the Eleventh Amendment or state sovereign immunity to guarantee that
the Atascadero standard is met. Justice Kennedy used the 1986 Amend-
ments to the Rehabilitation Act (ARA)188 to "underscore the difference"
between statutory language that meets the Atascadero standard and that
which fails. 189 The ARA provides that "A State shall not be immune
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
from suit in Federal court for a violation of [several enumerated provi-
sions] or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation by recipients of Federal financial assistance." '190
The majority in Dellmuth determined that "[w]hen measured
against such explicit consideration of abrogation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the EHA's treatment of the question appears ambiguous at
best."19 ' The majority was careful not to expressly judge whether the
ARA met the Atascadero standard,' 92 but its use of the ARA as a com-
parative model of legislative drafting indicates that the ARA defines the
level of clarity required by the Court. The high degree of specificity of
legislative intent to abrogate is absolutely essential to ensure that an
amendment to Section 1983 will bring the states within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.
HI. Proposed Amendment to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
In order to protect individuals from unconstitutional state actions,
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 should be amended as follows:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for
185. Id. at 231.
186. Id. at 230.
187. See supra notes 138-165 and accompanying text.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988).
189. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 229; see supra notes 152-160 and accompanying text.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988).
191. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230.
192. Id. at 229.
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a violation of this Section or the provisions of any other Federal
statute enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States.
The adoption of this proposed amendment is compelled for at least
two reasons. First, the Supreme Court's retroactive application of the
Atascadero standard to federal civil rights statutes virtually strips these
laws of any enforcement value. Second, the Court's refusal to look at
legislative history to inform its statutory interpretation of federal civil
rights statutes requires an explicit statement of intent to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment.
The applicability of Section 1983 against states in light of the Elev-
enth Amendment has been an interpretive "bouncing ball" for the
Supreme Court.
The Court has demonstrated particular difficulty identifying proper
party defendants when private plaintiffs seek vindication of Section 1983
rights in federal court. In Monroe v. Pape, 9 3 for example, the Court
held that Section 1983 did not extend liability to cities and municipali-
ties. Nearly twenty years later, Monroe was overruled in Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services,1 94 and local government entities were defined
as "persons" under Section 1983.
Prior to Monell, the Supreme Court had alluded, in dicta, to the fact
that if "cities and other municipal corporations" were excluded from the
reach of Section 1983,195 then Section 1983 "could not have been in-
tended to include States as parties defendant." '196 After Monell, the ques-
tion remained whether a state, like a local government entity, was a
"person" under Section 1983.
Quern v. Jordan 197 held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Sec-
tion 1983 suits against states in federal court because the statute did not
"explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep
away the immunity of the States."'1 9 The Quern Court, however, did not
address the issue of whether the state is a proper Section 1983 defendant
in federal court if the state expressly waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The question presented after Monell, therefore, remains
unanswered.
193. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
194. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
195. The Court relied on its holding in Monroe. See supra note 193 and accompanying
text.
196. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976); see supra notes 118-124 and accompa-
nying text.
197. 440 U.S. 332 (1979); see supra notes 139-145 and accompanying text.
198. Quern, 440 U.S. at 345.
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In its 1989 term, the Court held that a state is not a "person" for
Section 1983 purposes when suit is brought in state court.199 In light of
this recent decision, it is unlikely that the Court will find states to be
"persons" for Section 1983 purposes in private suits brought in federal
courts despite any state waiver of eleventh amendment immunity.
Where does the array of eleventh amendment decisions leave pro-
spective Section 1983 plaintiffs? Given the departure of Justice Brennan
and the majority of Justices' entrenched respect for the Eleventh Amend-
ment, states are immune from private Section 1983 suits in any court-
room, federal or state. Citizens who seek relief under Section 1983 are
left with federal civil rights but no guaranteed means of enforcement.
Congress could not have intended or envisioned such an irrational result
when it passed the Reconstruction Amendments. This assertion is sup-
ported by the Reconstruction Congress's debates that addressed the issue
of federal jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court itself recognized in Monroe
v. Pape.2" The Monroe Court stated that
[t]he [Reconstruction Congress's] debates were long and extensive.
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.20'
Congress must act now to restore federal civil rights because the
Supreme Court has refused to do so. Section 1983's erosion substantially
weakens the rights of the nation's poor and underrepresented, and more-
over the rights of every individual, as represented by Professor Doe.20 2
The legislative path is fraught with obstacles to expedient abroga-
tion of eleventh amendment immunity, particularly considering Con-
gress's recent refusal to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1990. Despite this
grim political climate, Congress must act because the Supreme Court has
abdicated its role in protecting against state actions that violate both the
letter and spirit of Section 1983.
IV. Conclusion
The Eleventh Amendment, as currently interpreted by the Rehn-
quist Court, allows state agencies to violate federal statutory and consti-
199. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); see supra notes 60-69 and
accompanying text.
200. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
201. Id. at 180.
202. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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tutional law with impunity. The Court's eleventh amendment doctrine
devalues the individual's constitutional rights and guarantees by subordi-
nating them to state autonomy. The Rehnquist Court's continued en-
dorsement of Hans v. Louisiana20 3 and its progeny achieves what the
Civil War barely averted-a country divided into independent state sov-
ereignties that are subject to federal civil rights statutes by consent only.
Legislative actions alone cannot guarantee individuals' civil rights
and liberties. A state may enact a law that expressly withholds its con-
sent to Section 1983 suits in the state court system. Should the state
violate an individual's or an underrepresented group's federally protected
civil rights, there is no judicial forum to hear the claims against the state.
The state courts lack jurisdiction because of the state's "no consent" stat-
ute. The federal courts lack jurisdiction because of the state's eleventh
amendment immunity-even for violations of federal statutory and con-
stitutional law! Congress must respond to the Supreme Court's eleventh
amendment doctrine if Section 1983 is to have any practical application.
States must not retain the arbitrary power to immunize themselves from
federal laws enacted to protect constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.
Federal court jurisdiction is compelled to ensure that all individuals and
underrepresented groups will have the means to attain the protections
and benefits Congress intended by enacting Section 1983 over a century
ago.
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